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Energy Trade and the National 
Security Exception to the GATT 
By Donald N Zillman* 
Three topics combine in this paper: international trade, national security, 
and energy. The specific focus of the paper is the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the "essential security interests" exception 
contained in Article XXI. The provisions of the GATT set out the structure 
of a system to encourage international trade by reducing tariffs and other 
trade barriers. 
More broadly, many aspects of international trade in energy have devel­
oped outside the structure of GATT or with the implied assumption that 
Article XXI or another GATT exception would take them out of normal 
GATT arrangements. National security matters have often played a role in 
energy law and policy in a way that overrides free trade objectives. 
Nonetheless, several recent treaties and decisions have imposed free trade 
goals to override national security claims involving energy trade. 
This article examines Article XXI and its application. The law of Article 
XXI has been created by non-energy trade. We then turn to energy trade. 
Using United States law as an example, we examine some of the areas in 
which alleged national security reasons have set a policy other than the full 
working of an international free market. We conclude with a look at the 
changing meaning of national security in the post-Cold War world. 
GAIT national security exception 
Article XXI defines one limitation on the application of GATT. In essence, 
Article XXI suggests that other values may supplant the goals of trade 
liberalisation. In its entirety the article reads: 
"Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed: 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security 
interests; or 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which 
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests: 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which 
they are derived; 
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of 
• Dean and Edward Godfrey Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. 
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war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations; or 
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursu­
ance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security." 
Subsection (a) has been characterised by one recent commentator as 
allowing abstention from action. 1 The provision leaves the decision as to 
what are "essential security interests" to the nation asserting the claim. The 
obvious categories involve military weaponry and plans. In the late 1940s 
when the provision was drafted, atomic technology was the most visible 
example. The provision appears to have excited little contention in the half 
century since. 
Subsection (b) allows actions contrary to GAIT's trade liberalisation 
goals. 2 A nation can claim that an obligation under GATT can be ignored 
because of"essential security interests". Again, the language of the provision 
indicates that nations are able to decide for themselves ("taking any action 
it considers necessary") as to what matters fit within the exception. The 
three subsections appear to move from the specific to the general. Subsection 
(i)'s coverage of fissionable materials or the materials from which they are 
derived was directed at the most significant military weaponry in any 
country's arsenal. Recall that until the mid-1950s there was little peaceful 
use of the atom. The nuclear electric generating industry came after the 
drafting of GATT Article XXI. Subsection (ii) involves traffic in arms, 
ammunition, and "other goods and materials as is carried on directly or 
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment". Here the 
range of products is far wider. The supplies to run a modem military organis­
ation touch a vast range of manufacturing establishments. Nonetheless, the 
"purpose of supplying a military establishment" provides some limit to the 
provision. Subsection (iii) is the most troubling and open-ended provision. 
"Any action . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international 
relations" is so broad as to allow almost any measure as an exception to 
the GATT. If the definition is left to the nation asserting the exception, 
nothing may be outside the language. "Time of war" is at least definable 
by events other than a nation's desire to avoid a GATT responsibility. 
"Other emergency in international relations" lacks that specificity. 
Subsection (c) has also been of little consequence. It provides that the 
UN Treaty obligations involving peace and security are superior to conflict­
ing GATT obligations. Quite likely, any matters arising under United 
Nations Charter obligations could also be justified under the "time of war 
or other emergency in international relations" language of (b)(iii). 
Scholarly commentators have been troubled by the open-endedness of the 
1 Michael Hahn, "Vital Interests and the Law of GAIT: An Analysis of GAIT's Security 
Exception", 12 Mich J Int L 558, 579 (1991) (Hahn). 
2 Hahn at 579. 
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national security exceptions.3 They have argued for a legal rule that Article 
XXI does not give carte blanche to a state to justify any breach of the GAIT 
based on security grounds. Their discomfort may be both that the provision 
"brings the politics of international disputes into the legal world of trade 
and business"4 and that it clearly suggests that international politics trumps 
matters commercial. An author has expressed concern that Article XXI 
"would allow the exception to emasculate the rule of liberal trade orders".5 
Another author observes that GATT contracting parties tend to declare 
Article XXI as "an unqualified escape clause" but in practice it has been 
applied "only in reaction to what was perceived to be an internationally 
wrongful act".6 A half dozen actual disputes over 40 years put Article XXI 
in context.7 
1949 United States v Czechoslovakia The dispute followed shortly after 
the drafting of the GATT and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia. 
The United States imposed export control licences to prevent the shipment 
of goods to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs contended that the United States 
had violated the GAIT. The United States defended in part on the exception 
provided in Article XXI. The United States took the position that Article 
XXI gave it wide scope to define matters within its national security needs. 
The Czechs argued for a narrower exception. The United States argued to 
the Contracting Parties that "every country must have the last resort relating 
to its own security". The Contracting Parties rejected the Czech complaint. 
Mr Hahn's summary of the dispute suggests he was less disturbed by the 
decision on the merits than by the expansive United States position that 
suggested a nation might define almost anything as related to national secur­
ity.8 He argues that the matters identified in subsections {i), (ii), and (iii) 
of subsection (b) encompass the range of matters which may be asserted 
under a Section XXI claim. 
1961 Ghana v Portugal Ghana, one of the first of the independent black 
nations of Africa, restricted trade with Portugal by banning certain 
Portuguese products. The Ghanaian representative stated: "It might be 
observed that a country's security interests may be threatened by a potential 
as well as an actual danger. The Ghanaian Government's view was that the 
situation in [Portuguese colony] Angola was a constant threat to the peace 
of the African continent and that any action which, by bringing pressure to 
bear on the Portuguese Government, might lead to a lessening of this danger, 
was therefore justified in the essential security interests of Ghana". 9 Ghana 
also asserted the position that each nation was the "sole judge" of its essen­
tial security interests under GATT Article XXI. 
3 See Hahn; Note, "The Politics of Procedure: An Examination of the GATT Dispute 
Settlement Panel and the Article XXI Defence in the Context of the US Embargo ofNicaragua", 
19 Law and Policy in International Business 603 (1987) (Politics of Procedure); David Knoll, 
"The Impact of Security Concerns Upon International Economic Law", II Syracuse Journal 
of International Law and Commerce 567 (1984) (Knoll). 
4 Hahn at 580. 
5 Knoll at 587. 
6 Hahn at 569. 
7 They are usefully summarised in Michael Hahn's article in the Michigan Journal of 
International Law and in a Note in Law & Policy in International Business. I borrow liberally 
from the authors' summaries. See notes I and 3. 
8 Hahn at 569-70. 
9 Summary Record of the Twelfth Session Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneve, GATT 
Doc SR. 19/12 at 196 (1961 ). 
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1974 Germany v Iceland The German Government and the govern­
ments of four German coastal states banned the landing of fresh fish from 
Icelandic trawlers. Iceland claimed Germany had violated the GATT. 
Germany responded that Iceland had violated international law in its unilat­
eral extension of its fishing zone to the disadvantage of German and other 
nations' fishing fleets. Backed by a favourable opinion from the International 
Court of Justice, Germany asserted that its act was a legitimate countermeas­
ure. Iceland responded that even if its action were illegal under international 
law, that did not provide a basis for Germany to violate the GATT. Germany 
retorted that a legally justified countermeasure under international law could 
not be illegal under the GATT. The German argument continued: "[t)he 
General Agreement did not represent an isolated legal system. Rather, it 
was embedded in the general rules of international law. Otherwise, any State 
could constantly violate the economic interests of its neighbouring State 
which would be forced to renounce any countermeasure it wanted to take".10 
Hahn notes his surprise that Germany declined to accept the application of 
the GATT rules "to a highly political dispute, thus even refusing to use the 
possibilities offered by article XXI"Y 
1975 Sweden In November 1975 Sweden introduced a quota on certain 
footwear. Sweden cited what commentators refer to as the "spirit of Article 
XXI" in its defence. 12 Sweden noted that "the decrease in domestic pro­
duction has become a threat to the planning of Sweden's economic defence 
in situations of emergency as an integral part of its security policy. This 
policy required the maintenance ofa minimum domestic production capacity 
in vital industries"Y The Swedish position was greeted with widespread 
skepticism. It was terminated by unilateral Swedish action 18 months later. 
Hahn distinguished this case as the baldest assertion of "economic" as con­
trasted to "political" reasons. 14 He suggests, without further elaboration, 
that the Swedish dispute raises the question of whether other GATT escape 
clauses (for example, Article XIX with its more stringent requirements) limit 
the scope of Article XXI. 
1982 European Community, Australia, and Canada v Argentina In 
response to the Argentine seizure of control in the Falklands (Malvinas), 
Community and Commonwealth nations suspended imports from 
Argentina. The suspending nations asserted their rights under UN Security 
Council Resolution and "on the basis of their inherent rights of which Article 
XXI . . . is a reflection ... ". Hahn again notes the reluctance to base the 
claim directly on the GATT.15 Several nations among the Contracting 
Parties criticised the reliance on unspecified inherent rights rather than pre­
cise provisions of Article XXI. The suspending nations argued that the 
GATT was the wrong forum to be resolving a major military-political issue. 
A statement of the Contracting Parties appeared to recognise merit in both 
10 GAIT Council, Minutes of Meeting held 18 February 1975, GAIT Doc CJM/103 (18 
February 1975) at 16. 
11 Hahn at 573. 
12 Politics of Procedure at 619. 
13 Minutes of Meeting Held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 31 October 1975, GAIT 
Doc C/M/109, at 9 (1975). 
14 Hahn at 578. 
15 Hahn at 574. 
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positions and, in Hahn's phrase, left "almost everything as obscure as it was 
before".16 
1985 United States v Nicaragua United States relations with the 
Sandanista regime in Nicaragua festered throughout the 1980s. Initial trade 
restrictions by the United States were not justified under any exceptions to 
the GATT. On 1 May 1985, President Reagan issued an Executive Order 
that declared actions of the Nicaraguan Government to constitute "an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy 
of the United States" _17 The order declared "a national emergency to deal 
with that threat". The President prohibited imports and exports from 
Nicaragua. Nicaragua claimed a violation of the GATT. 
The United States declaration was greeted with considerable skepticism 
in the world of GATT. The United States response was seen as excessive in 
the particular circumstances and wrong in asserting the unilateral right to 
determine national security exceptions. Even parts of the United States busi­
ness community were opposed to the United States position. 18 
Eventually Nicaragua secured reference of the dispute to a Panel created 
by the GATT Council. However, the Panel's power was constrained con­
siderably by the agreement that it could not consider the validity of the 
United States' invocation of Article XXI(b )(iii). The Panel eventually 
reported to the Council on 5 November 1986. It did express criticism of the 
United States embargo noting that it flew in the face of GAIT's goal of 
promoting free trade. In guarded terms, the Panel also suggested that the 
United States had wrongly balanced its national security interests against 
the need for stability and growth in international trade. However, even the 
opponents of the United States position on policy grounds seemed to con­
cede that the United States had the right to impose the embargo under 
existing law. The Council concluded by asking further study of the scope 
of the national security exception. It proposed two options to resolve the 
embargo. Either the United States could end the embargo or Nicaragua 
could retaliate. The Contracting Parties did not accept the Report due to 
United States opposition. In 1990, after the electoral defeat of the Sandanista 
government, the United States lifted its embargo. 
Energy and national security 
The ideal world of GATT envisions free movement of goods and services 
among nations. Tariffs are low or nonexistent. Other laws and customs do 
not hinder the movement of goods and services. In theory the commodities 
and services that compose energy could operate in that fashion. In practice, 
they have not. Even in the United States, with its considerable dedication 
to the 'free market' and its distrust of public ownership, government regu­
lation or involvement has characterised segments of the energy sector. Often 
national security reasons explain the deviation from free market and free 
trade goals. Some of these national security justifications fit within the lan­
guage of GATT Article XXI. Others go well beyond it. In both cases, analy­
sis of law and policy suggest that national security reasons may be only a 
16 Hahn at 575. 
17 Executive Order 12513 of I May 1985. 
18 See Beacon Products Corp v Reagan, 814 F 2d I (I Cir 1987). 
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part of the explanation for the trade restraint. Three aspects of United States 
energy law illustrate national security restraints on trade. 
Petroleum import-export controls 
The crucial nature of petroleum in running a modem armed force has been 
visible in several government actions limiting open trade in petroleum. The 
Mandatory Oil Imports Programme from 1959 to 1973 sought to limit the 
amount of low cost foreign oil that reached the United States. 19 The pro­
gramme was justified on questionable national security grounds. Excessive 
foreign imports could make the United States hostage to the demands of 
politically unpredictable foreign suppliers. The cheap foreign oil could also 
destroy parts of the domestic oil industry. In consequence the United States 
bought far less Middle Eastern oil than it could have purchased in a market 
free of government control at pre-1973 embargo prices. 
The United States has also imposed export controls on petroleum. A 
notable example was the ban of exports on Alaskan oil after the Prudhoe 
Bay discoveries of the 1960s. Current law forbids the export of crude oil 
transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline subject to Presidentially 
initiated exceptions.20 The statute reflects a mix of national security (the 
need to preserve a scarce resource for essential purposes), political, and 
environmental reasons. 21 
These petroleum policies are the product of unilateral action by the United 
States. Federal statute also supports United States participation in the 
International Energy Agreement. This Agreement codifies the determination 
of the major industrial nations to deal with a repetition of the oil producers' 
boycott of 1973.22 
Network bound export-import controls 
Cross border trade in natural gas and electricity has the potential to be a 
major contributor to energy needs. Federal regulation of both natural gas 
under the Natural Gas Act and electricity under the Federal Power Act 
includes such transnational regulation.23 A federal licence issued by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is needed for exports. National 
security considerations are a rather small factor in permitting product move­
ment among Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Securing uninterrupted 
energy supplies from Canada was a major United States objective in nego­
tiations leading to the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Article 
907 of the Agreement limits the availability of the national security 
exception. 
National security was the major factor in the Reagan Administration's 
attempt to impede construction of the natural gas pipeline from the Soviet 
19 Presidential Proclamation No 3279, 12 March 1959. 
20 50 USC App 2406(d). 
21 Having won a bitter political fight to build the 800 mile pipeline through environmentally 
sensitive terrain, the government could not afford the perception that the oil was supplying 
foreign markets objectives. 
22 42 USC 850 I. The President is given power to take actions when he finds "with respect 
to any energy sources for which [he] determines a severe energy supply interruption exists or 
is inuninent or that actions to restrain domestic energy demands are required in order to fulfill 
the obligations of the United States under the international energy programme". 
22 15 USC 717b (natural gas); 16 USC 824a(e) (export of electricity). 
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Union to Western Europe in the early 1980s.24 The national security con­
cerns ranged from Soviet access to militarily useful technology to strengthen­
ing of the Soviet economy through the infusion of hard currency from the 
gas sales to the potential for a Soviet political embargo of a crucial energy 
resource. Eventually, the United States gave up its effort to stop the project 
having harmed primarily its own manufacturers. 
Nuclear energy 
Nuclear power has always been a special case. Even the most devoted free 
marketeers and free traders hesitate at the prospect of uncontrolled nuclear 
commercial activity. The United States Atomic Energy Act reflects the deli­
cate balances among military and peaceful uses and promotion and protec­
tions. The statute's Declaration of Policy observes that atomic energy "shall 
be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, 
subject at all times to the permanent objective of making the maximum 
contribution to the common defence and security".25 Likewise, the statute 
encourages the international peaceful use of the atom "to make available 
to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy 
as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common 
defence and security will permit".26 
Further sections of the Act forbid issuing commercial nuclear licences to 
an "alien or foreign controlled corporation"27 and prohibit various activity 
if it is "inimical to the common defence and security".28 International 
exports are subject to provisions of legislation discouraging proliferation of 
materials useful in the making of nuclear weapons.29 
The recently enacted Energy Policy Act of 1992 sheds light on current 
Congressional thinking on energy, trade, and national security.30 The House 
Report on the Act describes a "comprehensive national energy policy that 
gradually and steadily increases US energy security in cost-effective and 
environmentally beneficial ways'?1 Among its goals are the reduction of 
petroleum imports,32 an increase in the size of the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve33 and the encouragement of nuclear electric power through such 
programmes as more expeditious nuclear plant licensing,34 resolution of the 
site for long-term nuclear waste disposal,35 and creation of a new private­
sector-based nuclear fuel enrichment corporation.36 
24 See Public Papers of President Ronald Reagan 1982 at 831-32. 
25 42 usc 2011. 
26 42 USC 2013(c). 
27 42 usc 2133. 
28 See eg, 42 USC 2074(b) (plutonium distribution); 2112(b) (foreign distribution of bypro-
ducts material); 2133 (commercial licences). 
29 42 USC 2153; see generally, Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, Public Law 95-242. 
30 Public Law 102-486, Energy Policy Act of 1992. 
31 House Report No 102-1018, 1992 US Code Cong & Admin News 1953, 1955. 
32 Public Law 102-486, Title XX. 
33 Id, Title XN. 
34 Id, Title XXVIII. 
35 Id, Title VIII. 
36 Id, Title IX. 
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Evolving meanings of national security 
For half a century from 1940 to 1990 "essential security interests" centered 
on the use of military force to preserve national sovereignty, if not the nation 
itself. The World War II attempts at military domination by Japan and 
Germany were followed by the Soviet Union's imposition of military control 
over Eastern Europe and the worldwide competition between the 
Communist and capitalist blocs. From approximately 1947 to 1989 two 
threats dominated national security planning by the Western nations. The 
first was the risk of massive nuclear war brought about by design or accident. 
The United States and the Soviet Union built enormous nuclear arsenals 
targeted at both military and civilian targets. While opinions differed as to 
how bad the "worst case" nuclear exchange might be, no serious analyst 
doubted that a major exchange of nuclear weapons by the superpowers 
could work the largest destruction of any conflict in human history. The 
second threat was the conventional military assault on Western Europe. The 
prime scenario for ground combat for NATO forces was a massive Russian 
atta~k through the Fulda Gap in Germany with the goal of military and 
political domination of all of Europe. This threat compelled the positioning 
of 300,000 United States troops in Europe (primarily West Germany) for 
almost half a century. 
These two events helped define other United States assertions of security 
interests over the last half century. Only the worldwide struggle against 
Communism explains the massive American interventions in Korea in 
1950-53 and in Vietnam from approximately 1961 to 1973. It explains the 
crises-short-of-war exemplified by threats to Berlin in 1948 and 1961 and, 
most memorably, the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. It also explains the 
various small wars (Grenada in 1983) and covert actions (CIA involvement 
against the Mossadegh Government in Iran in 1954 and destabilisation of 
the left-leaning regimes in Guatemala in the 1950s, Chile in the 1970s, and 
Nicaragua in the 1980s). 
National security policies involving nuclear weapons sought equivalence, 
if not superiority, over the other super-power with considerable attention 
given to the alternative means of delivery (the nuclear triad of bombers, 
ballistic missiles, and submarine launched missiles) and sought to discourage 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. Efforts by the super­
powers to limit the number and potency of nuclear weapons were largely 
unsuccessful for most of the Cold War. 
The events of 1989-91 changed the Western definitions of "essential secur­
ity interests". By conventional definitions the NATO alliance "won" the 50 
year struggle. It is worth recalling that few Western leaders of the mid-1980s 
could have anticipated so total a victory. By the standards of 1985, Western 
leadership would probably have conceded Communist domination of 
Eastern Europe and parts of the third world, Soviet military equivalency, 
and the perpetual continuation of Communism in return for an agreement 
that would have reduced the tensions and economic burdens of the warfare 
society. By 1993 far more had been achieved. Eastern Europe had achieved 
independence. The Soviet Union itself had fractured. Communism as a gov­
erning ideology had virtually collapsed. The Russian military threat had 
receded and Communist regimes elsewhere (Cuba, North Korea) appeared 
economic basket cases and ideological anachronisms. All in a span of five 
years. 
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The half century of conflict has left its legacy in the United States and 
elsewhere. Although popular enthusiasm varied, the United States asserted 
"essential security interests" to justify a wide variety of Government actions. 
A hardly inclusive list could include elaborate programmes controlling 
government employee loyalty, various controls on product imports and 
exports, national defence educational programmes and highway systems, a 
covert national security apparatus, and the direct military expenditures on 
a "second to none" nuclear force and a conventional military with worldwide 
projection abilities. The last was designed to have the capacity to fight a 
minimum of one and a half wars at the same time - resisting a Russian 
assault in Europe and fighting a smaller war (possibly Soviet inspired) else­
where in the world. National security took on an expansive meaning and 
one that was often asserted to override other values and normal consti­
tutional processes. 
The end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet nuclear threat has 
not ended United States concerns about national security. In the narrowly 
military sense, the world remains a dangerous place at least as far as 
American interests are defined. We can identify a half dozen likely justifi­
cations for the use of force: 
( 1) As operation Desert Storm has shown, the United States and much 
of the developed world regard a plentiful and stable flow of oil from 
the Middle East as a paramount national interest. The region's con­
tinued instability makes possible the prospect of further military 
actions to secure resource access. 
(2) The continuation of Arab-Israeli tensions (though lessened by the 
Israeli-PLO agreements) adds to the Middle Eastern tensions. For 
the United States and for much of Europe the survival of the Israeli 
democracy is an imperative to be defended with the use of military 
force. No other country that faces a plausible threat to its national 
integrity calls up such a degree of support. 
(3) The nuclear concern continues. Today any Russian or United States 
nuclear attack probably would be accidental rather than a conscious 
choice of national military strategy. The greater concern may shift 
to newer members of the nuclear club. Israel-Iraq, North Korea­
South Korea and Pakistan-India all offer the realistic possibility of 
a nuclear attack. Clearly, the developed world has strong incentives 
to prevent such an exchange. What is less clear is the Western reaction 
if the exchange should take place. 
(4) Threats of major cross border wars continue. Some may have as their 
objective the virtual annihilation of the losing state. Others may seek 
more narrow territorial, resource, or political objectives. Again, the 
range of major power concern varies. 
(5) Numerous nations are threatened with disintegration on the basis of 
religious or ethnic identity. Russia and Yugoslavia are the most visible 
recent cases. 
(6) Humanitarian activity requiring military involvement may be gaining 
popularity. The Somalian intervention is the recent example. Law 
and the media combine to encourage humanitarian activity. Law has 
gradually eroded the assumption that a national leadership might 
treat its citizens (including the ethnic or religious minorities) however 
it wanted. Worldwide media coverage can force human rights viol­
ations on the public conscience in a way never before possible. 
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All of these examples suggest that major powers will continue to keep 
and use military force. A literal definition of an "essential security interest" 
may rule out certain of these actions as grounds for GAIT obligations. Is 
the Somali intervention truly "essential" to the security of the United States 
if that term means the continuation of the United States as a political and 
economic entity? Most certainly not. However, a half century of exaggerat­
ing national security threats may leave some hard habits to break. As the 
GAIT disputes over Article XXI suggest "essential security interests" 
remain in the eye of the beholder. 
A second issue involves the extension of "essential security interests" 
beyond the purely military. Historian Paul Kennedy has addressed the point 
well. "[T]he definition of national security cannot refer simply to military 
policies or to military spending alone. I think it ought to refer instead to 
those sources, those underpinnings of long-term national strength in the 
state and power of our manufacturing, investment in science and technology, 
of educational skills, all of which ultimately the Armed Forces and defence 
policy of this country have to rest upon" .37 Article XXI itself is a mix of 
references to the narrowly military (eg "traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war ... ") and the more expansive ("fissionable materials", 
measures taken "in time of ... other emergency in international relations"). 
Over the last decade political discourse in the United States has defined 
"essential security" to include matters beyond purely military threats. The 
January 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States identifies four 
"national interests". The first is the predictable: "The survival of the United 
States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact 
and its institutions and people secure". The second is less obviously a justifi­
cation for armed force: "A healthy and growing US economy to ensure 
opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavours 
at home and abroad". Its subhead is to: "Ensure access to foreign markets, 
energy, mineral resources, the oceans, and space".38 The two most visible 
American examples would be the national economic decline and the threats 
to the environment. Neither the world in which the United States has lost 
its industrial competitiveness nor the one spoiled by pollution is a secure 
world. The damage to the structure of society from these harms is seen by 
some to be every bit as great as from a military defeat of all but the most 
cataclysmic type. This interpretation of "essential security" could justify 
almost any trade restriction under GAIT Article XXI. 
Conclusion 
Energy trade has been something of a special case. The importance of the 
energy product to buyer (securing an essential military or economic resource) 
and seller (sometimes securing a major portion of export earnings) has pro­
vided an incentive that has allowed trade to take place. At the same time 
37 American Economic Power: Redefining National Security for the 1990s, Hearings before 
the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, lOist Cong, 1st Sess, 9 November 1989 at 23. 
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992 at 5. 
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national security factors have intruded where domestic interests are threat­
ened by unrestricted trade. 
The end of the Cold War lessens but does not end national security claims. 
It surely expands the prospects for energy trade worldwide. But, such trade 
may now be more subject to the lengthy negotiations and cumbersome 
obstacles common to trade in "less strategic" commodities. 
